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THESIS ABSTRACT

The problem which this

Kent's ettempt
postuleta

thesis

to frame en ethical

of' moral freedom (i.e.

in human neture."

implications
of' Kentien

morel eutonomy),

While the exeminetion

in the thesis.

generelly

In.deed, the issue

tempting

may also

fer Kent •s phllo:!!ophy in genet'fll but this
of the thesis.

The investiga

the presentation

and ~nslysis

auto .nomy end radicel
works ~ritigue

as it

evil

of Practical

cf Kent's

doctrines

in some detail

since

the derinition

of their

The first

~a ction

lnterpratations

Prim3rily,

the section

John R. Silber,

ere not explorgd

beyond the scope

es much es possible

specific

to

argument for moral

found in his t1110major ethical
Princioles

tree tise,

o[

B.£.LJ.gio_n_

However, the major interpretations

of these

av!l e!'e examined

terms !s crucial

ror

cc~patibility.
of the thesis,

end analysis

differing

Jon~s,

too lies

of mo1'8l eutcnomy end radk~l

any ex~rnination

o presontation

vistas

as well es his religious

of Reascin ~lone.

innete

beyond the boundaries

Reason and The fundamental

tl-t~ !Yle_taohysi
.c of Ethics,

lll,ithin the pmits

is

of "radical

have broad repercussions

Hon is limited
or Kent's

based on the

may well have signif'icant

theories

these

is Immenuel

and et the same

as the doctrine

for moral end religious
thought.,

to treet

system ultimately

time to espouse whet he describes
evil

proposes

"moral Autonomy" consists

of

of som3 of the moro proo1inent and
of Kant•s notion

deals

of moral eutonomy.

with the views of Hens Vaihinger,

and Lewis White Beck.
•iv-

w.

Both the "fraadom es

T.

fiction"

interprete

ti on

fulfillment"

interpretation

representing

Kant's

spontaneity"

interpretation

additional

insights

and the "freedom as personality

of Jones ere rejected

0v.tnviN

that a full

suggested

or Vaihing~r

as

of' moral autonc1ny.

of Silber

The • freedom as

is endorsed,

understanding

but it is also

of moral autonOffly requires

of Beck with respect

to the distinction

"freedom es spontenei ty" end "freedom as autonomy."
tion of moral autonomy upon which the balance
constructed

is,

e combination

therefore,

not accurately

the

between

The interpreta-

of the thesis

is

of the viems of Silber

and

Beck.
The second section
a systematic

presentation

of the thesis,
of' Kant's

doctrine

in human neture."

There is much less

definition

term than surrounds

of this

autonomy."

This is probably

where Kent fully

treats

discussion

there

of it

The final

this

two Kantian doctrines.

of morel eutonomy in affirming

defined

redicel

evil

of this

it

Third,

philosophy

may not ultimately

the

the only place
!Ind his

straightforward.

of the compatibility

is argued that

of these

Kant was very well

his fundamental

ethical

postulate

evil.

Second,

of radical

he carefully

evil

of "moral

in the Religion

the doctrine

the compatibility

p~oblem of affirming

111orally depraved because
dubious.

that

end reasonably

danger,

innate

and successfully

in such a way the t it does not contradict

autonomy.

general

is

contains

concerning

the definition

doctrine

aware of the danger of contradicting

due to his cognizance

controversy

is en enalysis
first,

Evil,•

of "redical

due to the fact

is thorough

secUon

"Radice!

bee
that

of these
s5tisfactory

two doctrines
resolution

moral

in Kent's
of the

ll'l!lnis both morally responsible

t<ant·'-s understanding

of radical

evil

is

end
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INTRODUCTION

The long evolution

of philosophical

thought

end sheped by a multiplicity

or creative

h0111ever, a few philosophers

enjoy e place

ocing to their

overtly

of philosophical

inquiry.

His philosophy,

end providing
will

direction

namely his attempt
on the postulate
e

doctrine

of Plato

for future

itself

philosophical

of moral autonomy,
innate

evil

and theologians,

fraa

scholars

but else

have rather

complexity

he is innately

lightly

dismissed

difficult

when a philosoph -er

proponent.

The purpose

case for the compatibility

~ith
primarily

respect
from his

of the Metaphysic

morally

this

of the stature
thesis,

writings,

two major ethical

is,

based

works,

issue

latter

of

debate among both
has been compounded
man is

corrupt.

many

position

es

being

becomes more

of Immanuel Kant is the
therefore,

the examination

end the Critiaue
-1-

philosophy,

The

of moral autonomy end radical

to Kant's

of Ethics

rich

not ~nly that

end yet such a dismissal

of this

problems
"ihis

system ultimately

of enduring

that

contradictory,

among

investigation.

in humen nature."

end its

obviously

stands

philosophical

or Kant's

in the case of those who would wish to affirm
morally

such e position.

and at the same time to affirm

man's moral freedom ha8 been a topic
philosophers

to the development

perennial

an ethical

multiplicity,

prominence

and Aristotle,

with one aspect

to construct

of "radical

of particular

contributions

both in clarifying

concern

Among this

Immanuel Kent occupies

along with that

the most influential

thesis

significant

minds.

has been influenced

The

to examine Kan~s
evil.
will

Fundamental

of Practical

be drawn
Principles

Reason,

es

-2well a~ from Kent•9 religious
of Reason Alon~.

or the

The first

more significant

•oral

eutonomy.

doctrine

~ection

section

1

es ~ent,

sy~tematically

himself,

erticulated

attempt

to evaluate

of these

their

concArning
elucidation

h~ also
red!cel

recognized

evil

ethiCfll

to preser.t

e treatment

or Kantian

radical

other

implicit
light

although

concerns

both within

occeision.

perh~ps

therefcra

issue

(i.e.

His comments
provide

which he undertook

issue
receive

un~ttendad

the attention

other

thesis

is

in this

end beyond it
issues,

must be left

questions,

before u~, will

Reason.

th9 compatibility

Kant's philosophy
of these

helpful

e

is hoped that

work, and therefore

even thsse

in the particular

and will

between ethics

the purpose of this

The consideration

Kent's

in the

interrelatedness.

and moral autonomy) it

beyond the scope of this

Nevertheless,

e distinction

consideretions

of one spscific

evil

will be highlighted.
lies

it

of Ethic~ end the Cri.tigue ,of' Prac.tical

In much the same way, then,

process,

present

two terms the fine!

in the Religign_, therefore,

of the strictly

in the met!lphysic

their

of

competibility.

Although Kent wished to maintain

end religion,

some

understanding

•ill

Then, given the definition
will

will assess

or Kent's

interpretations

evil

R~l!gion Within the Limits

cf the thesis

The second section

of redical

B~llgion.

t r e~tise

however,
unattended.

mhich ere

be seen in e new
due to them on another

I.

~ORALAUTONDmY

As mentioned in the Introduction,

the Kantian undarstending

or .morel eutonomy 111ustbe exp lice ted prior
specific

problem with which this

in K3nt • !S concurrently

contradiction

freedom end innate,
understood

thesis

radical

of Kant's

Kant presumably
et e certein

in time preceding,'
with the general

or another

that

principle

Kant sought to define

order

the na tur~l

tesk of this

section

or moral eutonomy.

this

necessity

defini Hon as 1 t is presented

Pring_ples

or the l'l1et1'physic of Ethics

1
Williem

in accordance

that we ere bound

us

the

wey that

it

me must keep before
freedom in such

a

and men•~ plece as a "ohenomenon"

is r.ot to critically
we shall

takes place

of mh~t existed

end (ii)

nor man's dignity

Rather,

law.

In working towards a Kantian

of moral freedom, therefore,

within

contradictions

that

conditioned

of causality,
1

action
result

end so is completely

natural

be viewed within

epperent

'every

of time is a necessary

did not ccntredict

of' moral

However, the !~sue of' how Kent

to do only ~hat we ere free to do."
definition

the apparent

between moral freedom and natural

held both "(1)

point

(I.e.

a t'f'irming th!! notions

evil).

discussion

namely, the contradiction

Kant's

is concerned

the term "moral autonomy" must itself

the context

feet that

to the t:rea tment of' the

es a moral ngent.
assess

attempt
primarily

~ant's

to discover

The

definition
and explain

in the .Ll!fillarr.enl:al

end the £1:.liia:Je

of Prac_~ical

Thomzs Jones, MoJ~jity and Fre e dom in the Phil..Q.gophy
9f Imma nuel Kant (Oxford University
Press, 1940), P• 1.

-3-

Reason.

to do this,

In order

significant

interpretations

before

one of these

given.

The three

theory

R. Silber's

major

of Kant's

theory

of

on behalf of the •rreedom

several
autonomy'

or a new one

which we shall

of "moral

consider

freedom as fiction,"

are

2 (2) w. T.
3 (3) John

fulfillment,"

freedom as spontaneity."4

In The Phil os ophy of 'As If'

quoting

can be endorsed

freedom es personality
"moral

to consider

'Jse of tha term 'moral

interpretations

of "mcral
theory

is necessary

interpretations

(1) Hans Vaihinger•s
Jones'

it

as fiction"

from Kent •s The Fundamental

Hens Vaihinger
interpretation.
Principles

presents

his argument

He begins

by

of the Metaohvsic ·of

Ethics:
Now I says
Everything that cannot ect otherwise
than •under the idea of freedom" is therefore
in practical
respects reall y free, that is to say, for him ell the laws
count which ere inseparably
connected with freedom, as if
declared to be free end indeed by
his will were o f itself
e proof accept ab le in theoretical
philo s cphy.
thet to ea~h being who has e will
Now I maintain
we mu~t necessa r ily also ettrib~te
the idea of freedom by
which elone he acts.
for in such e being we conceive e
reesort that is p·r.icticel,
the t has caus-ali ty in reference
to its objects.
It is impossible
to conceive e reason that
in full conscic m sness would be directed
in respect to its
judgments by s o~e outside source, for than the subject would
ascribe the determination
of his judgment not to reason,
but to some impulsion.
Reason must look upon itsalf
es the
of it s principles,
independent of foreign
originator
reason or
influen ce s. Cons equently it mus t, es practical
will of a rati nnal being, conceive itself
as frea, that is
to say, its 1111.11cen be e will of its 011n only und!!r the

2Hans Va!hi nge r, Jhe Philo so phy of 'As If',
(New Yorks Harcou rt , Brace, & Co., Inc., 1924).
3w. T. Jone s , ~ity

trans.

by

c.

K. Ogden

and Fr eedom.

4 John R. Si l ber, " The Ethical Significance
of Kant's Religion,"
in the Intro.
to I mnanue l Kent, Re li gion Wi thi n th e li mit s of ~ eason
~lor)_t,i, trrin s . by Th e odore m. Greene and Hoyt H. Huds on ( Nell: Yorki
Harper & Row Publi s he rs, 196 0).

-sidee of freedom., and this idea !l,ust therefore
in every
practical
respect be ettributed
to ell rational
being9.S

Veihlnger
•fictional

ta~es

passege •es s cle~r

this

view" of moral freedom for he (Ve!hinger)

here Kent cleerly
!dee without
Veihinger

end unembigiously

Nor does Vaihinger

interpretation.

Indeed,

V2ihinger

Kent conseiously

espoused

this

that

resolution

me reach the highest

pinnacle

at this

eltitude:

et all

e less

rersfied

etmosphere."

A closer

inspecti

conclusions.

First,

by Kantian

but elso
contradic-

thought,

"Here

or indeed,

can continue

the vest majority

to

need e different,

7

:OIJ of the pessege

to lend strong

not only that

Veihin g'Sr insists

Only e few, only en elite,

breethe

hOU1ever, fails

believed

of the apparent

lew end morel autonomy.
ettained

morel

Kent •es unaware of this

apperently

tion between netural

by eny humen thought.

in Kant's

view of freedom es fiction

Kent saw it as en acceptable

thet

"• ••

however, thet

out a deficiency
suggest

•rite5

Kent 1 9

freed0111to be but e mere

It must not be essumed,

he wes pointing

thought

philosophy.

5

reelity."

decleres

or

statement

support

it is not clear

ing that moral freedom is ultimately

which Veihingar

to either
that

quotes,

of Vaihinger's

Kant is s bt ing or even imply-

fictitious.

Kaot simply says,

•••
Everything that cannot act oth e ·rwi sa than
in prac t ical
"under tho idea of fre e do m" is therefore
respects really fr ee •••
Reason must look upon itself
as the ori ginator of
its principles,
ind ependent of foreign influence s . Consequently

5 I m<n
Bnuel

Kent,

Th<.?Fund ame nt a l Ptl.D£1,.PJes

of EJ;hj.~ , tr an s . by Otto Manth ey-Zorn ( New York:
Crofts, Inc., 1938), P• 67.
6vaihingers

~As If,'

7 Ibl d ., P• 293.

P• 289.

of t he Me taph ys _ig_

Appl e ton-Cant ury-

it must, es pr:!lcttcal
raason
conceive itself
es free ••••

In other
free (i.e.

free.

act

words,
"under

man

both prect!cally

be morally

•hi .ch ere inseper!!bly

to rare go the question

grrunds

that

Indeed,

he explicitly

which Valhinger

re~olutlon
states

19 practically

it

" •••

simply states

ultii,,ately

for him '!ll

or man's

theoretical

le not essential
this

free

that

free)

he

the laws count

111th freedom. 119 Therefora,

connected

es

mean that men is not ectuelly

f~ee (i.e.

responsible,

willing

its

beinq must v!e~ himselr

Rether,

and thao ,retically.

even if men were not theorgticelly
would still

being,

the !dee of' freedOffl") end t:herercre

doos not necesserily

But this

cf e rational

u

I'!!tional

a

e5

ot ,,,dll

Kant is

freedom on the

to the task before

him.

in a note to the very passage

quotes.

I em adopting this method or assuming as sufficient
for our purpose that freedom is merely "as an idea" made the
bests of ell actions
of rationel
beings, so that I moy be
of proving freedom in its thecrerelieved or the necessity
ticel respect also.
For even when the ietter
i3 left

undone, then for the being who cannot act otherwise than
under the idea of his own freedom the se18 laws still
apply
which would bind en actually
rree being.
Thus Kant •as net suggesting
but only thet
proof of

Ethics

moral resp onsibility

freedom ■

Indeed,

and th,;, Critique

did not consider
•••
philosophy to
contradiction
upon the ract

8 Kent,

10lli£.

does not require
passeges,

of Practical

the theoretical

both in the Met~physlc of

Reason rnl!lkeit

freedom to be fictitious.

clear

that

~ant statess

it is en indispensable
tesk of speculative
point out that the deception regarding this
(between netural necessity end freedom) rests
that whsn we call e man free we think of

~j!'phygic

9.!£!.rl.

other

that morel freedom is e fiction,

of Ethics,

P• 67.

Kant

-7-

him !n enoth~r sense 9nd in a diffor~ nt relation
then mhen
me consider him as part of nature end subje~t to its lews.
It must point out also the t the two not only can go together
very well, but must be recerded as necessarily
unitad in
11
the seme subject ••••
And in the C~itigue
does not herewith

of its

true

grow in insight

problematic

only practicel,
that

status

of Practical

Reason, "Speculative

but only in respect

concept of freedom,

reality

for Kent moral freedom has

then the concept of r.ature

e

given.

different

(i.e.

natural

11

,

2

Howaver, this

is not to say that

freedom ls e fiction

is primerily

rather

Vaihinger's

interpretation

that Kent equated

the objective

such en equation

of Kent's

ethic~.

As

it

but only that

then speculative.

for

with the fictional,

is ever made in Kant's wri tlngs.

seem~ to be antithetical

w. T.

13

would have to be demonstrated

Bnd the prectical

end tc my knowledge no ,;uch equation

Indeed,

in examples of experience."

practical

to stlrnd,

It is certainly

law) which "proves

must prove its

significance

though

epishmologieal

end necessarily

its

reality

to the certitude

to which objective,

is now indubitably

ree · Jn

Jones phrases

to the whole thrust

its

•••
to call a bF.lief e fiction is to say that
whet is believed is not the cas9 •••
Kant's whole inquiry
mes designed to explain the possibility
of freedom and
thereby to establish
that obligation
is an objective
feet and not an illusion;
and it is impossible to believa
thet Kant could have accepted es satisfactory
the conclusion
thet it (freedom) is a false hypothesi3 to which nothing corresponds in ract. 14

11

,i.1hite

Ibid.,

P• 76.

12 Immenuel Kant, Critique of Practical
Reason, trans. by Lewis
Beck (New Yorks The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956), P• SO.
13 Kent, metag~ic
14w. r. Jones,

~lity

or Ethics,

p. 76.

end freedom, PP• 44-~5.

-eIt would saem, then,

t~at

or tcent•s

11Htings

98 ■

freedom as e useful

•oral

would resolve

neithsr

tend to support

the "lstter•

Veihinger's

fiction.

the contr8diction

nor the "spirit"

conclusi rPf\ that

It may be that

between netur8l

Kent

such e vie•

lew end freedo~.

But,

it would do so on terms uneccepteble

to Kant because

it would forfeit

the ~orel

morel obligation

to en illusion.

dignity

w. T.
■orel

Jones suggests

freedom in his

Jl!llll9nuel Kent.
around

of men by reducing

15

another

-

Jones'

it

with the principle
Reason,

entire

16

obligation."

referred

satisfies

to

or understanding

the following
es laid

compatibility
F"urthermore,

that

affirmed,

it

criteria&

with the reality

compatibility

"(1)

of Pure

of morality

Jones openly admits

is the only interpretation

of

freedom in

down in The Critique

view of morel freedom for which he ergues
sense

view or

of morel freedom pivots

discussion

of causality

end (ii)

of Kent's

book Mortili ty end F"raedom In the Philosophy

the problem already

euch ~e way that

interpretetion

that

end of

the "Kantian"

ls no·t "Kantian

11

in the

which Kant explicitly

but only in the senses

this "critical"
theory was in feet held by
h0tuever, with other theur!es from which he
seems never to have distinguished
it); (ii) thet it satisfies
Kent's own "Pr.obl emstellung,"
while these other theories
do
notJ (iii)
thet it goes e long wey towards bein~ en adequate
solution to our own conception of the problom. 1
(i)

that

Kent ( together,

Jones begins
e discussion
the notion

of the
that

his articulation
11

16

l.b.ll!..'

lh1.!i·

p• 3•

"criticel"

noumena/phen.9 mena" distinction.

noumena can be causally

world on the grounds

15

of Kant's

that

this

efficecious

would contradict

theory ·by
Jone-s rejects

in the phenomenel

natural

necessity

and

-9-

thereby

preserve

the reeli ty of mcrr.1 otiligation

cost

of denying

the principle

that

et times Kent himeelf

key to en eccepteble
nature!

lew.

either

thought

resolution

"Problemstellung"

that

this

the satisfaction

or the solution
Jones'

Jones willingly

edmits

wes the

of the entlnomy between freedom end

two criterieJ

wey to pre~ent

18

that. nouman~l causality

However, Jones insists

of his final

The best

of ceusality.

et the uneccepteble

to our present

argument

view feils

to setisfy

of Kent's own
view of the problem.

is to quote it,

Let us suppose, in eccordence with Kent's thesis,
that a, b, end care
the entecedent
events which condition
the occurrence of e certain act P• Now if one certain
occasion, efter the occurrence of a, b, e, the agent does q,
wh8t we assume, and what Kant himself essumes, is simply
that xis another
thet some factor x has also occurred,
event, et the moment unknown, end that a, b, c, x, conditions
the occurrence of Q• If we did not make this assumption,
it
would obviously be in principle
impossible to pradict human
conduct with cert2inty,
end we should have to abandon the
thesis,
on which Kant insists,
that ell events happen in
accordance with unchangeable laws.
It is clear, moreover, not only that this essumption
leaves no placa for the hypothesis
that there hes been e
manifestation
of noumenel causality,
but that the hypothesis
itself
is really meeningless.
For, if q is noumenally caused,
which brings it about
th~n x, the factor in the situation
thet q rather
than p occurs, is non-temporal.
Therefore,
though q is en event an d occurs, there is no time et which
x happens.
But whether q happens or not is supposed to
power,
depend on whether or not x ex e rts its efficacious
end this is really meaningless ■ It is quite impossible to
attach any significance
to the idea of x and q varying
concomitantly
where x does not "arise or begin et e certain
time ■"

•••
Hence, on Ka nt's own terms, there seems but
one conclusion
to drsis
that noumene a6e not causally
tlli th re spect to phenomena. 1
efficacious
After
to develop
"will"

rejecting

the ceusel

his intarpretation

not es e "spontaneous

---------19 Ibid.

--

exercise

P• 4 snd following.

'

PP• 7-8.

of noumena, Jones goes on

of morel eutonomy by considering

-~

18 Ibid.,

efficacy

of noumenal coussllty"

tho
but es

-10-

• causal,
•il!'s

phencmenel,

cogniti~e

•ill

psychicl!l

power.

eve,.,t.

Tha C!!Usal espect

beyond the merely eognitivs.

111erely contemplete

as objects

its

objects

proceeds

within the context

to discuss

it is et least

ethics,

claims

to be "Kentien"

it

certein

The ethical
universe!

end

interpretation

men).

that

satisfies

such an ect,

es the distinctive

men, end it

ber.euse of the peculiar

is only

good eet of 111111is
es regards

its

content,

is reaUzed."

21

of human per$onality

is

pert

is necessary

there

this critericna

of e morally

commend towards the fulfillment
bec ~use reason,

system which

the morel law is both e universe!

Jones suggests

"Our eccount

one interprets

the concept of the"!!. priori"

the kind of eet by which personality

ls po~ses~ed hy all
necessity,

to

necessity,

that any ethical

that

Whet distinguishes

is

will

such en unde!standing

h011ever loosely

morel end which fully

itself.

now complete.
is thet

that

must contain

and for all

personality,

that

them

tinally,

the adequacy of this

of the mot·el lew (i.e.

one legitimately

does not

of morel obligation.

Kent's

end necessary

•••

or

eontempletes

it

with the demands of natural

Jones begins by noting

charecter

reeson

es non-existent;

Jones is confident

is consistent

he therefore

"Practieel

the

the definiton

uhieh means thet _it is governed by end subject

the laws or nature.
of the will

extends

to do something ebout." 20

which we propose

is phenomenal,

The p!!yehici,l emphedzes

or hur.~n personality,

in the sense of "felt"

worth of reason. 22

Thus, it is not from the concept of a rational
being that 1110 should try to deduce the moral law, but

20

Jbid.,

P• 29.

21lli.!i.•,

P• 97

22 Ibid., PP• 80-85.
nocessery moral imperative.

Jones rejects

the possibility

of~

logically

-11-

upon tho velua (or worth) of such e creature that we should
reflect if we would understend both tha Cfltegoricel form
and the A priori
end, which a~e the distin~~ishing
cheracteristics
of the morally good ect of will.

With this
end!. priori

definition

of the morel imperative

commend t0111erds the fulfillment

th the concept
eoneli ty, end 1111
event,

Jones is able

This critical
resolution
freedo~

theory

to conatruct
is,

embryonic foro.

ever give en eccount

es a phenomenel,

of per-

psychicel

theory of freedom.

to Jones,

not only e setisfectory

between natural

on grounds which eliminetes
the theory

end realization

•critics!"

e

according

of the contradiction

in the sense that
least

of will

as the cetegoricel

neither,

necessity

but is elso "Kantian"

can be found in Kant's

The key question

end morel

writings

"Does Kent

for Jones is,

of freedom which consists

in et

in saying that

to be

free ~eens to be moved by the kind of thought which we have just
described?if 24
This thought contains in the first place, the
change in the stete of eff~irs
representation
of a certain
es being one by msens of which personality
can be realized,
end, in the second place, the recognition
that the worth
of perecnelity
has as an end in itself
a sufficient
ground
for producing the change.25
Jonas believed
Kent's

discussion

to Kant's

he found such ~en eccount

of the eutonomy of the will.

will which relates
central

that

to its
ethics,

•self-legislating"

of freedom in

This espect
function

end Jones understands

of the

is certainly

Kant to mean by it,

the t the \I/ill is not only the means by which the mora 1 end is realized
but is else

the moral end itself.

is not necessary,

23

according

tbid.,

P• 100.

24_1bid •,

P• 101.

25

Jbid.

In order

to Jones,

to realize

the t the will

this

end, it

be f-re o in the

sense that

being unaffected
thet

necessary

or

it is capeble
it~elf

initi~t!~g

by previous

acts
events

while at the seme time
in time (i.e.

the 11111 be "spontaneous"~•

it is not

Rather,

To call en act free is not, in e word, to deny
that it is en act, for then, indeed, "e free will mould
be an absurdity."
It is simply e way of characterizing
an important kind of practical
thought which sometimes
moves us.
Pr3ctical
thoughts ere, by definition,
causes
which are, without exception,
the effects cf a~tecedent
events in time.
What distinguishes
those which we call
free is not, thorefore,
the way in which they are causes
er effects;
but the kind of thought that they are. 26
Hence, "freedom

•••

is not incompatible

with materiel

because freedom does not mean 'not-determined.'"

freedom understood

way confirms

which is both categorical

obligation
then,

in this

Jones concludes

that

while still

remaining

within

resolution

and morel freedom is,
the general

At the same time,

the legitimacy

end !!. prior,i.

a successful

tion between natu.:-al necessity

27

necessity,

of morel

On this

basis,

of the contradic•
indeed,

freme~ork of Kent's

possible
own

philosophy.
Thus there are not two different
ects--a
noumenal
ect end e phenomenal act.
There is one act {taken as e
. sequence of events in time), which is through end through
natural,
end which differs
in no essential
way from any
other causal series.
But in virtue of being the particular
kind of ect which it is, a value of a certain distinctive
kind is realized
•••
moral goodness, in a word, is just
that kind of value -u,hich is experience~ whenever a certain
8
kind of thought turns practical ••••
And es it is the concept of freedom which gives
expression to this value which reason has in itself,
Kant's
claim is essentially
justified:
it is precisely
the concep~
9
of freedom which reconciles
morality and natural necessity.

26
lbid.,
27

P• 109.

Ibj_Q_., P• 120.

28 Ibid.

--- , P•

29

Ibid.,

137.

P• 139.

Despite
seem that
steted

th~ i nitial

his position

earlier,

respect
that

pers ua s i v~rss s of Jone~• argument,

i!! susceptib

Jone~ admits

that

to freedom is "Kentien"

l e bl numerous objections.

only in a limited

he (Kent)

contends

thet

his

espoused
(Jones')

that

his

interpretetion

is a reesonably

conception

of the problem"

this

lies

issue

first

work end therefore

require

Jones begins
notion

adequate

Jones'

assertions

He states

do lie

within

own

third

assertion,

to "our own

solution

between freedom and natural

necessity,

for

However, the
the bounds of this

comment.

the deve lopment of his own view by rejecting

of noumena as being causally

phenomena.

with

Jones

Kent's

beyond the scope of our investigation.

end second of Jonas'

view,

Sscond,

of freedom satisfies

not becaicerned

mith

Jones proposes

of personality"

views es well.

concept

We shall

•Problemstellung."

other

sense.

does

As

the theor y ~hich he develops

Kent held the ~freedom a~ fulfillment

although

it

efficacious

the

in the realm of

•

• • • if q is noumenally caused, then x, the factor
in the situation
which brings it ebout that q rather than
p occurs,
is non-temporal.
Therefore,
though q is 9n event
But whether
end occurs, there is no time at which x happens.
q happens or not is supposed to depend on whether or not x
exerts its efficacious
power, and this is really meeningless. 30
Now, it m8Y be that

efter

e thorough

philosophical

idee of noumenel causality

is "really

passages

(noumenal causality)

means.

suggest

that

Kant writes

this

in the Critique

meaningless,"

of Practic~l

enelysis

yet e number of

is precisely

whet Kant

Reason:

In the concept or a will, however, the concept cf
causality
is already contained;
thus in that of a pure will
there is the concept of causality
with freedom, i.e. of a
causality
not determinable
according to natural laws and
30

Ibid.,

PP• 7-8.

the

consequently
not susceptible
to eny e~piric~
ir.tultion
as proof' • • • Noui the Ctl fi C9pt of !I bsir.s 1~h ch hes a
free 11111 h that of e "~~ ~ru:?.U•"
In Religion

Within

the temporel

effects)

the Limits

origin

is thus

nf Reason Alo~e, Kant stetes,

of free ects
contradiction."

a

as such (es though they were naturel
32

It is clear

that

K~nt not only affirmed

but also

thet

he mas eble

ceusality

to allow

the efficacy

themselves

assertion

if one is willing

is a category

non-temporal.

of cognition

but not necessarily
suggests
this

that

by no meane excludes

which is ell
causes

that

~ant wanted to establish.

Therefore,

noumenal causality
the Critique

view, that

of Pr a ctical
the will

phenomenal,

psychical

Kant expressly

he is opera ting
to natural

31

32

Reason is also

process
states

Kent never

can be "known,"

but

of noumenal causal! ty

Jones•

refutation

The quotation

evidence,

such

contrery

cf
from

to Jones•

by Kant to be merely e

which is subject
the t the concept

is one of a will

phenomena)

senso in which Kent defined

on l<entian terms.

was not considered

time

It simply means that

it does not seem thet

is cogent

(i.e.

no1Jmena).

possibility

con never be "known" in the strict

•knowledge."

laws.

(i.e.

noumenel causes

the factual

was, that

to appearences

to things-in-themselves

such ncn-temporel,

e "meaningless"

es Kant surely

which epplies

of

of noumenal causes

Nor is this

to accept,

of ncumenal

for the possibility

events in the phenomenal world being the results
which are

"To seek

to all

of the natural

of the will

which is "not determinable

with which
according

laws."

Kent, Prac t ical

Reason,

PP• 57-58.

Immanuel Kant, Religign Within the limits of Rea son Alone,
trans. by Theodore rn. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, ( New Yorks Harper &
Row Publishers,
1960), P• 35.

-15We must now turn to a cor.sic~.ation
of freedom.

Agein,

Kent nor adequ!lte

it would seem that

of autonomy (i.e.

ethics,

ls not true

that

ection.

onomous action

\llhile

heteronomous

if we accept

must be un-free.

it

is

theory
true

true

to

that

is et the core of Kent•e

action

end personality

And yet,

ucriticel"

view is neither

self-legislation)

which ls not self-legislative
un-free

this

for morel responsibility.

the notion
it

of Jones'

for Kent (i.e.
fulfilling)

Jones•

action

is necessarily

view of freedom,

Indeeq Jones himself

states

heterthisa

The assertion
of men's freedom is therefore
not en
assertion about the way in which certain events are caused.
It is en assertion
about a certain kind of value.
Hence,
•e may not say at ell that Cain's act of killing Abel was
"free,"
since we can be reasonably certain
that it ~~s
note sense of duty which moved him to do this act.
But what ere we to say of Cain's
responsible

action?

fer an act which is not free?

the "I ought implies

I can•: rationale,

us with en answer es to how we ere
contribute

to the fulfillment

considered

free.

Can he be held morally

Jones never ch~llanges

yet neither

to consider

or personality

does he ever supply

ects - which do not
and thus cannot be

Kant hed no such problem for he saw both the autonomous

end the heteronomous

es expressions

of a free,

morally

l'esponeible

egent. 34
On l:el.ance, then,
personality

Jones'

is unsatisfactory

own criteria.

It is neither

view of freedom as the fulfillment
because
Kantian

such e view; nor is it an ~dequate
because

it erodes

33
34

Jones,

the very basis

morality

it

fails

to fulfill

in the sense that
solution

to Kent's

of moral responsibility:

even Jones•
Kant espoused

"Problemstellung"
the ascription

~.!l,dFreedom, P• 136.

We shall say more about this
view of freedom es spontaneity.

in our discussion

of

of Silber•s

-15-

or morel

pr:!ise

by deFining

end bleme.

ects

im~oral

It ellnws

a:ts.

e9 un-fra~

would be to fundamentally

us to praise

but not to bhime

To c2ll

misunderstend

such a view Kantien,

or Kent's

the th:-ust

entire

endeavor.

ethicel

view of moral freedom which we must now inspect

The fine!

the "freedom es spontaneity~
essay "The Ethicel

to Jones•

view presented

Significance

st .rang refutation

states,

"Responsibility

in free

individunls

external

absolutely

of spontaneous

consistent

causation,

be personal

who can act without

or his

es e statement

Religion.n 35

of Kant's

cannot

end anteced~nt

by John R. Silber

causes."

36

own pergonel
with Kant's

unless

it

takes

Silber

explicitly

can be concentrated
to action

this

by

not simply

but one which is

conviction,
own view.

in his

In opposition

being determined

And Silber

is

He cuotes

Kant:

lllhat we .ilsh to understand
and never shall
is how predeterminism,
according
to which

understand

actions,
es eve:its,
have their d'.Jter1niriir,g
ground in antec~dent
time (which, with what happened in
it, is no longer. within our power), can be consistent
with freedom, according
to which the act es well ea its
opposite must be within the po~er of the subject at
the m0111entof its taking place.37
voluntary

f"reedom then for Silber
independence

and for Kant implies

of the will

from external

spontaneity

influences

(i.e.

the

end antrcedent

determine tion).
~3

•e noted

earlier,

Jones•

bill ty · f' heteronom ,ous action

action

f~ils,

Silber

has no such problem.

35

by

Silber~

36 rbid.,
37 Kant,

definition,

"Ethical

being

free

action,

because

to be a "personality-fulfilling"

the possi-

heteronomous
experience ■

f"or him, "Heteronomy end autonomy ere

·
Significance,"

P• lxxxvii.
R9ligicn,

view of freedom precludes

P• 45.

PP• lxxix-cxxxiv.

the two primary modes of expressi ng t?"a:"l
;c
~cer,dentel

if one chooses
this

to act on the basis

is done, according

desire.•

This ect,

therefore,

is not a "fulfilling
hetercnomous

es if

presumably
animal,

"I shell

(i.e.

is es much the actualization

on the basis

it denies

accor.ding

of its

to Silber,

Evan

or desire,
chosen

act acco~ding to my strongest

this

and yet it
39
freedom."
While

freedom in principle
ror exemple, an animal

strongest

is not free.

free),

of' transcendental

no such freedom were possible.

acts,

passion

38

of the freely

of trenscendentel

freedom es is eutonomous action,
by acting

on the basis

is spontaneous

realization

action

of his strongest

to Silber,

~hich says thet

maxim of choice,

freedom."

desire.

However, en

But, it is important

to

note thet the animal is not free not because it acts heteronomously
but because

it does not have a will

end previous
en enimal

man, who is free,

determination.

(merely on the basis

theless

remains

choice,

whereas the animal's

therefore,

it

by actin

With this

g

~.§.

this

is radically

states

38

39

Ibid.,

"Ethical
P• xc.

its

of a maxim of

The letter

possibility.

confirms

The former

po s sible.
cs

spontaneity,

Silber

goes

As one ml~ht expect,

from Jones• theory of the will•

Kant construed

Significanc~,

way, never-

Hateronany and autonomy,

of the will.

different

influences

in which case

in this

of man's freedom.

of freedom

definition

th a t although

Silber,

is not.

exhibiting

understending
Kant;s

definition

desire);

is tha result

ll freedom 111erenot

on to explicate

Silber

action

both expressions

men's freedom by practically
dsnies

or his strongest

free because his ection

from external

may choose to act like

But man, even in acting

man l'lcts heteronomously.

ere,

which is free

11

the will as a

P• lxxix.

unl tary

11

-1afaculty,•

neverthelos:s

to distlnguiah

af the •ill
betw,een

he thought. it helpful

three

of the will.

In the fulfillment

is e fecul ty of desire,

11

of this

of the pleasures

~1th the elternntives

must not be understood

function,

sort

es~

open to It."

40

of enimal instinct,

by the strongest

impulse,

a~ to which impulse

deeision

but that

it enticipates

However, Willkur
for this

would

to establish.

does imply is that man's will is influenced

determined

Whet

by impulses

impulse.

is to be the strongest.

Only after

Silber

the "purely

reticnal

aspect

freedom,

0 1·

llliJJe is a part

its

a tion,

P• xcv.

t\ 1 Ibid~

P• civ.

___
,

by Kant es representing

introduced

41

l:!Ulktir is free

other maxims inconsistent
freedom, but Willa

to the will.

to choose
affir·ming

with the morel

constitutes

As such, Wille

internal

of man's will,

401.lli•,

is

of the will-"

own demand for sal f-ful fillrnent.
to wards self-realiz

11

of' the wlll

in accord 1111th the moral law, thereby

to adopt

abnegating

.

to ths capacity

primarily

"l:Jille

suggests

those maxims which are

law thereby

by

Thus, Willkur does not deny human freedom but

Wjllk,Y,!. refers

lllhereas

its

this

it.

presupposes

to choose,

end

Wlllkur is free in the

choice has been made can we say th8t man's choice is determined
the strongest

function

the will

or displeasures

deny the very freedom which Kant was attempting
Willkur

The first

for Kant held that Wi 11kut is determined

to the strength

in connection

cf enalysie

the power to cheese

ls denoted by the wcrd, "Willk>.Jr~ i

elternet.ives.

according

functions

~apa~te

foi: purposes

implies

the will's

en incentive

It is precisely

that moral experionce

is

.because

atitonomous"

11

in the sense that the categori~~l
The function
adopt

of Wille,

then,

imp~rative

ls to provide

thees maxims which ere consistent

en incentive
in Willkur
"simple

respect

(~ille)

is the capacity

sufficient
respect
~Ille,

l~•,

towards the moral
is described

for respect

to the mill

is a sufficient

maxims in accordance

of the moral lam.

never be entirely

in the

to personelity

for the moral lew as in itself
This capacity

to motivate

Thet is,

a

for simple
42

us would thGn bo moral feeling."
Willkur

to choose
to notice

Wille does not predetermine

Wil l~ end the dictates

to go against

although

Willkur

to fulfill

its

of Wille and fail

incentive

As

with the moral law, but it is important

tinally,

to

which Wille arouses

"The predisposition

incentive

is always free

demend.

to Willkur

which consists

(Willkur).

that Wille is only en "incentive."

Willkur, which

incentive

the moral hJi.

with

as a "moral feeling"

for the moral law within
then,

8n

the desire

for the moral law.•

incentive

is s self-imposed

can choose to ignore

own freedom, !'Jj.Jlkur

devoid of Wille for "when tha incentives

the

cen

which can

from freedom are taken away, man is reduced to a merely enimal
43
being."
Such a reduction would render mcral experience meaningless
spring

end is,

therefore,

unthinkable

The fin~l

function

for Kant.

or faculty

of the will

which Silber

is what Kent dGnotes by the word, "GesinnY,!l.9,•" He (Kent)

it es "the ultimate

subjective

f~innung

chosen by Willkur,

is freely

responsible

• ground of the adoption

44

.!lli.,

p

4

20.

describes
,

of maxims."

44

and thus every man is morally

for his .Ges:i.nnung_. As the "ulUmate

42 Kant, Religl..Q.!l• PP• 22-23.
43
Ibid., P• 30.

describes

subjective

ground

--20-

of the adoption
promotes

the choice

. is treceeble
lying

Reason, Kant analyzed
terms of specific

to the Religion

level,

to en under-

of the underlying

men's moral experience

or "superficiel"

maxims.

and Kant•s fullest

of Gesir.nung.

significant

not only the

or Ethics end in the £rj.tigue

mexim es

of Prect!cel

almost exclusively

in

It is only when we come

articulation

that we se~ him locating

the level

extremely

mnxim but else

maxim but else

In the Metaohysic

of the will

Thus eny given morel ect

of the Gesinnung, we cen perceive

of the specific

well.

~exims.

mexim which

In su fer es we ere eble to see beyond the perticuler

to the level

~orality

or particul~r

not only to a "suparriciel"

mexim•

•exims

~J.O.D!-i,,9 ie t he underlying

of maxims,•

of his understanding

the heart

of morality

et e deeper

This new dimension however, is

for Kent's

concept of radical

evil,

as we shall

see later.
This then is

freedom es spontenaity
and from there
is opere tive
comments

Silber-•s

view of morel freedom.

(freedom from external

goes on to present

the process

He begins by defining

and antecedent

causes)

by which this

freedom

throu~ih the compound functions

of ths .,111.

Any er! tlcal

which could be mede about Silber•s

intArpretetion

of Kent's

view of f r.sedom would lndeed be brief,

his explication

of Kent's

writings,

because it 11ould seem the t

as far es it

goes, is fund21mentally

However, Lewis White Beck in his commentary on Kant's

correct.

f!.f....e.racticnl Re~~Q.il helpfully

C,r5.tioue

expands Silber's

position,
45

particularly

with respect

to the interrelation

of Willkur and Wille •

.,.
45

Lewis White Beck, !L.,.C.p
,mm
entary on Kant• s Cri tigue of Practical
Illinois:
University of Chicago Press, 1960),
pp.. 176-209.

.fu!!!s9n, (Chicago,

-21Beck distinguishes
and autonomy.

between t~o modes of freedom,

freedom in the sensa of spontaneity

of the 11111 es WilJ kur.

functioning
relates

to the exercise

in that

its

decrees

of the •ill

follom from its

of freedom Beck calls

sponteneity

refers

to the operative

freedOffl in the sense of autonomy
es Wille.

Wille is always free

own nature

necessarily.

"• freedom in the positive

sense,•

This type

or autonomy."

46

The sponteneity
of ~illkur
is "'freedom in the negative sense' or freedom
47
from nature."
While Wille is always free, ~.1,llkur is not.
In the
sense

of spontaneity

antecedent
Willkur

(i.e.

determination)

cen be free

Willkur

But at

for the "necessity"

in a wcomplete" sense only when spontaneity

and

moral action.

Therefore,

from the same deficiencies

of the cet8goricel

imperative

freedom be realized.

of man's fullest

does not contradict
together,

accurately

throughout

realization

Silber's
represent

the mete physic

only

Thus man can be both morally
the necessary

of himself.

but amplifies

of accounting

by showing that

and blamed, end yet the moral law is still

condition

heteronomous acts

the same time Beck's vieur has the virtue

in aiorel ec:ts can full
praised

end
but

and Beck's view does not suffer

as Jones•.

influences

is free even in evil actions,

autonomy, join in e truly
era free,

freedom from external

it.

Beck's view, then,

The two, when taken

the views of Kant ~hich he developed

of Ethic~,

Cri tioue

of _Practical

Reason, and

the Relig!.Qn..
moral freedom for Kent, then,
cafined

in such a way that

end responsible

46 Ibid.,

evil

moral agent.

P• 197.

47ll,ll,.,c:t.,P• 196.

acts
Rather,

is not a fiction;
cannot

nor is it

ue attributed

the freedom required

to a free
by morality

-22and consistent
mhose freedom

, in the decrees

witn natural
is

necessity

! .n thg exercise

s p,Jn t.aneous

of ;1lil1~.

sees man es a "£.ausa noumenpn,"

man fully

of t«Jillkur

sctu-a lizes

and autonomous

his freedom, however,

only when the "obligation-creatingtt

function

of Wille is united

the "obligation-executing"

of 1.1/illkur.

with

48

imperative
of his
• defines
this

function

is both autonomous

fullest

humanity.

innate,

ttnderstanding

radical

to m~n end necess~ry

t.!Je must no11 go on

evil

of morel

Thus the categorical

in order

for

to discover

to see if

it

is

the realization
how Kant
consistent

autonomy.

48 rhe terms 'obligation-creating'
and 'obligation-executing'
are introdu ced by Beck in~ Comm0nt3ry, P• 199.

11ith

II.

In his
Silber

essay

religion

"The Ethicel

"So class

remarks,

then,

that Kant could scarcely

relationship

between Kantien

lews,

it

Kant's
feet,

binds

is th a t ethics

the reverse

and most particul

that

of man
through

of the idsa

the ethi .cal. 1,ind metaphysic~!

50

Kant,

88

considerations

"Ethical
Re ligion,

Significance,"
P• 3.
-23-

"So far

a free

agent

to unconditioned

than the

the first

aiready

P• lxxx,

thing

religion

upon religion,
However,

who,

Being over him,

other

,nca of Kant's

of "radical

thesis.

emphasized

his reason

49
Silber,

himself,

Therefore,

is not dependent

in the discussion

of this

and religion

of a nother

is much clo s er to the case.
~rly

is basic

of the Religion.

the significe

49

theory."

ethics

his dut>•, nor of en incentive

ought to be noted about
ethics

~ithout

religion

Kant,

edition

himself

in need neither

of

and indeed the vital

and Kentien

for hi ~ to do his duty.nSO

lew itself,

his sthical

but not identical.

he is free,

for him to epprehend

that

e book on raligion

is bas ed upon tha conception

stands

is the relation

the former upon the letter,

is

to understand

to the first

in his prefaca

because

ethics

Religion,"

in the purpose and methodology

implicit

for Kent ere connected

Just

thinking

and expanding

However, we must be c~reful

es morality

of Kent's

was made in our introduction

to the rationale

this

in Kent's

have wirtten

illuminating

This same point

Significance

and so dependent

to ethics

si~ultaneously

RADICALEVIL

for

end in

in the Religion

evil,"
expressed

Kant expends
in the

Donald freeman has put it,
to !ta

COffies

is further

Kant's

by his treatment

to find whethe.:- it

evil

understanding

contradiction

of this

from Kant's
is clears

tnede himself

end could

earliest

radical

Either

for otherwise

of Kant's

of

doctrine
e:cpression"

it involves

the

be morally

Wille.

Therefore

of good, must lie

evil,

one thing

in such a wey as not to

"man himself

neither

must make or have

whether good or evil,

must be en effect

of his

good nor evil." 52

man possesses

him to adopt only evil

1

for it
Radical

a corrupt

maxims because this

Willkur
would deny

Nor, however, can man be said to

for the incentive

since

towards fulfillment

is also a necessary

the sourca of evil,

within

Willlc:ur and WillJ! as potential

must be within

account

he could not be held respcneible

morel law. which Wille represents,

evil

evil

condition

cannot mean that

e corrupt

end

evil

the "fullest

in a moral sense,

the meaning of morel experience,

mor-al freedom.

13 indeed

of mnral experience.

therefore

which enables

source

of the biblical

comments about radical

into ~hetever,

therefore,

possess

of radical

understanding.

he is or is to become.
choice;

of human freedom

of human freedom or whether

we must understand

deny the reality

evil,

doctrine

RXp1~9ssion iri hh

illumined

of redical

free

"understanding

51 We must n01,11
turn to an examination

the fell."

of

fullest

Kant's

the will,
sources

condition
just

as

of

the

and since we hav6 eliminated

of evil,

the Gesinr1U!!.9.• Kant leys

51

of the

the source

of radical

the groundwork for

Donald Dale Fre9man~ R~dir,al Evil and Original Sin:
Kant's
Doctrine or i"~eaq_~in €xistenti a l Perspective,
Doctoral Thesis for
Dre~ Univer~ity (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University
Microfilms,
Inc.,
1969), P• 7.
52

Kant, B,ellgion,

P•

40.

-25in illJ.!l0u nq by d:.'.scusslng

locetlng

redicel

implicit

in men's nature.

0 ~111

predisposition

The first
This predisposition
preserve t!on,

men (I.e.

propage tion

the social

to humanity"
oneself'

e kind of social

will

55

."

three

all

human nature

presuppo!es

possessing

These predisposi

but they ere also

good becausA they "enjoin

can lead

to vices:

for example,

of the predispos:l .ti c,, to e n::rnallty
predisposition
as "rooted"

That is,
desire

to humanity.

a vice

Ibid.,

PP•

21-22 ■

S4_It, j.d.

55 tbiF•, PP• ?2-23.
56

Ib_id.

for

incentive

of the

dl

all

three.

three

That

of these

(i.e.
gluttony

the observance
to animality

cf the

and to humanity)

and drunkene8s

in the case

ond envy in the case of the

but rather

"gra fted

11

with ot h ers,

.

upon t hem.

such as envy can be traced ultim a tely

to compare oneself

53

"the capacity

However, these vices a r.e not described

in the predispositions

Blthough

is the

a re not only origina 1 in man,

Hons

tw~ predispositions

tion,

represents

of thes ·e predispositions

predispositions.

The first

predbposi

e sufficient

e men ·could not be a man without

law."

to compare

to humanity"

which represents

Kant labels

in man in that

en inclination

The third

for the moral law as in Itself

es original
is,

es

the "predisposition

to personality,"

(Willkur)

end community mi th other

and to judge one's worth end happiness

consciousness.

"predisposition
respect

That is,

for self•

The second is the "predisposition

f.tself

indi•1iduals

terms. 54

to animality."

in man es the desire

of the species,

which manifests

1111thother

in those

itself

impulse). 53

"pr:a.disposHions"

the "predis~osition

is

manifest~

three

which is the manifestation

56

to the
of

-1 6the predisposition

predi!1posi tion

to hu~nity,
to t,umanity.

three predispositions,

predhpositions

the vices

as "rooted"

The predisposition

since it expresses

in hum~n nature,
to personelity

lem" end iN the case of tho third

sition

to good.tt 57

the go~d, Kant rejects
sinful

three

they "enjoin
predisposition

thet

311

two

they

"grefted"

can never le~d to evil
respect

predispositions

are

the observance

of the

in that

it

expresses

an "original

these predisp~sitions

what was then the popular

is to be identified

Therefore,

but rather

man can be seid to possess
In ~teting

of the

to tha first

of morel goodns~s (i.e.

In the sense that all

morel goodness itself,

traceable

to man's ne ture.

towards the good, in thet

result

hc!1!8nn:!iture presupposes

~hich ars

the very essence

for the morel law).
inclined

Thus, ~hile

ere not essentiel

ere not described
upon it.

envy !s net e necessery

notion

predispo-

ere towards
thet

the

with the sensual.

Kant, therefore,
elong with Kierkegaard, "parries
the rationalistic
view that the sensual itself
is sinful."
•••
Sin is not for Kant, as it was for Ritschl,
"ths
contradiction
in which man finds himself, as both a part
personality
cla i ming
of the world of nature and a spiritual
to dominate nature."
•••
Certeinly the contrast between
"'8n 1 s finitude
and his rationality,
his sensible needs end
inclinations
6nd his unconditionel
moral destination,
is
of greet significance
for Kant's view of man end his condition.
But 'this contrast
itself
does not make men en evil, a
sinful being,
Here again, Kant repudiates
the stoical
rationalism
with which he ls usually charged.
The valiant
stoics,
he said, were mistaken in seeing evil only in
"undisciplined
natural inclinations,"
where in fact evil
is really "en invisible
foe who screens himself behind 58
reason end is therefore all the more dangerous."
••••

Nevertheless
sitions

man c~n choose to ignore

end turn himself

57 Ibid.,
58Allen
Cornell

towards evil

the dictates
rather

of thsse

than good.

predispo-

And it

PP• 22-23.

w~Wood,

University

Press,

Kant's Moral Religion
1970), P• 210.

(Ithaca,

New York:

is

-27here that

redicel

both of which ere related

is said to be evil
goods.

That is,

the incentive
impulses

of

man is evil

the predispositions

Once egain ~e need to emphasize

subordination
takes place

ere good, but men

et the level

of the natural
at this

the adoption

level.

the "natural"

that

for Kent, there

evil.

One either

end humanity)~

the priority

of the moral
impulses

the basic morality

of an

Therefore,

the

A man mhose Gesinnung is oriented

the priority

recognizes

towards ecloption of

law and is good or subordine tes this

impulses

ground; one is either

and affirms

to wards

of the moral lau1

the morel law to the ne tural
is no neutral

to

to the mo.rel law or the reverse

is good, and e man whose GesinrlUIJ.9.is oriented

evil.

cf the "natural"

of Gesinnung.

impulses

of maxims which affirm

maxims which subordinate

or these

the priority

towards animality

a man is good if he recognizes

is located

inherent

if he adopts maxims which subordinate

le11 end chooses maxims which subordinate

individual

kinds of

b10

to the three predispositions

when end if he reverses
a

between

of the moral law to the incentive

(i.e.

Converse!~,

by e choice

All three predispositions

in every human being.

it.

under~t~nding

evil.

ror Kent, man ls confronted
go-0~

or Kent's

•e begin to 9~e the unfolding

the priority

law to othar

i!l

good or

of the moral

1.ncentives ~,td is

evil. 59
Thus, we understand
A msn is said to be "evil"

the meaning of the term •evil'

when he subordinotes

the morel law to the incentives
of Gc:sinnung.

59 Kant, Religi_on, P• 20.

of his natural

for Kant.

th € incentives

of

impulse~ at the level

-28~e cell e man evil, how9ver, net beceuse he
performs ectio ng that are evil (cont r ery to l ~ur ) but
because these actions era of s~ch e n2t ure t hat we may
infer from the m the presen~e in him of evil maxims ••••
In order, then ~ to ce ll a man evil, i t would hevg t o be
possible"~
orio r i" to infer from sev~ral evil a ct s done
■ 1th c0nsciou3ness
of their evil, or from ong such ect,
en underlying evil maxim; 21nd f urther,
from th i. ~ maxim to
infer the pre sen ce in the age n t of an underlyi n~ common
grrund, 1 tsel f a maxim, cf ell particular
morall y-evil
mexims. 60
But Kent wished t o de more than define
det1onstrate

that

this

evil

by the phrase

expressed

distinguished

'evil,'

is "natural"

"propensity

in men, a c~ncept which is

in that

whereas e predisposition

is "given." 62

evil

Cesinnung.

to Willkur

in that

the exercise

or his active

therefore,

•neturel"

acquired

his propensity

•by nature,"
defines

will

(i.e.

nature

is

i~ acquired,

propensity

morel evil

to

reletes

this

e ctivity

to evil

To some, the ess e::tions
and the t this

then excluding

to evil
it es

that

ory.

wit hin it

But, Kent
the exercise

it.

Lest difficulty
at once be encountered
i n the
expression "nature,"
which, if it meens (as it ~suelly
does) the opposite of "fr9edom" es e basis of ~c tio n ,
would flatly
contradict
the pre dicates "morally ~ good or
e\fil, let it be noted the t by "ne ture of man" wg here intend
only the subjectivg
ground of the exercise
(unda r objective

60

Ibid.,

P• 16.

61 Ibid.,

P• 23.

62Ibid.,

P• 24.

men

prop e,:, si ty is in men

contradict

in such a way es to incorporate

is

men's ~r opensity

but et the seme time Kent d~scribes

would seem to be blatantly

or freedom rather

this

Willkur),

of Gesinnung.

or in men "by nature."

acquires

e pro pensity

Again,

Although

A •p ropensity"

z men becomes mor1Slly good or ev : l only through

in the orientetlon

manifested

is,

in men's

61

to evil."

from a "predisposition"

is located

he also wanted to

-29morel lews) of rm'ln's freedom i v, ger.l'!l:~l, this ground-whatever is its cherecter--is
the nAcessery entecadent
of every ect eo parent to tha sense~.
But t his subj9ctive
ground, egein, must itself
~lw~ys be an expres~ion of freedom (for other1.11ise the use or ebuse of m~n ' s power of choice
in respect of the moral law could not be imput eg to him nor
could the good er bad in him be celled moral), 6~
This means that

the propensity

to evil

to menkind" 64 or "cen be predicated

universally

el though not in the sense "that
the concept

of his

species

it would be necessary;
through

experience

presuppose
the best.n

can be considered

evil
66

(thet

such e quelity
is,

but rather

we cennot

Kent sometimes

but this

is not to be understood

his evil

disposition.

cen be inferred

from
then

necessary
to this

es denying

of hi ~, or thet

me m~y

to every man, even to
prope nsity
the feet

es "innate,"
thet

man acquires

We shall say, therefore,
of the c~aracter
(good
or evil) distinguishing
men from other possible retionel
beings, that it is "innate"
in him. Yet in doing so we
shall ever take the position
thet nature is not to baar
the blame (if it is evil) or teke the cr edit (if it is
good), but that man himself i s its author.
But since the
ultimate
ground of the adoption of our maxims, which
must itself
lie in rree choice, cannot be a f e et revea l ed
i. t follows that the good or evil in man
in experience,
(es the ulti me t~ subjective
ground of t~ e ~doption of this
or that maxi m with ~e farence to the mora l l ew) i s termed
67
innate only in this s ense, that it is posit ed as the
ground antecedent
to every use of freedom in experience.
• •

63 .1.2iQ.., pp,
64

65
66

15 - 17.

Ibid.,

P• 25.

Jbid.,

P• 27.

Jbid.

671.E..1!!_., P• 17,

65

from what we know of man

judge otherwise

refers

of men as a species,

or man in generel)--for

thet

to be subjectively

ss "belonging

-30-

F'lnelly,

the ev!l disposf.ticn

is termed "radical"

because men must beer the responsibility
"Hence •e can cell

after all,
call

this

ever hold men himself

it e •radical'

brought

innate

of the original

to evil,

responsiblg

for it,

in human nature

predisposition
e propensity

However, since

and es 111emust,
~e can further

68

·

to good."

69

towards evil

of a "restoration

"• ••

~hich corrupts

his Geein-

the "good,"

duty bids us do this

it

(i.e.

good) , en d du t y d emend s no thi. ng o f us whi c h we canno t d o. "70
fore,

there

must be some way for man to reorient

become morally

good by adopting

the morel law.

Kant confesses

B8sily solved.

"How it is possible

bed tree

bring

confident

good f'rui t?" 71

that

he had an entirely

man's moral regeneration,
es e

"revolution"

6 8.!.!llii• ,

69

our comprehension

forth

P• '2B•

tbid.,

P• 40.

?Olbid.,

P• 43.

71lli.,Q_., P• 40.
72

lpid .• , P• 43.

72

the priority

evil

There-

of

satisf6ctory

That is,

that

man to make

for how can a

Although he obviously

Kant did suggest

or "rebirth."

become

is a problem which is not

for a naturally

a good man wholly surpasses

himself

feel

this

must

his Gesinnung end

madms which effirm
that

• • •

Thus far 111ehave established

man is commanded t ·o e ttain

for him to do so,

in him.

(yet none the less

we must comment on the possibility

tht!st 1118npossesses

be possible

presence

propensity

•evil'

upon us by ourselves)."
Finally,

natig.

a natural

for its

precisely

did not

explanation

for

it must be understccd

man•s Gesi~!)ll!l.9.must ~e

reversed

from its

morel lew toe

low.

orientation

new perspective

Kent views this

although

This,

revolution

is universal

man freely

ls Kent's

by

to fully

of this

the individual

comprehend the

of "ra~iC1!l innate

chosen by man.

end thus can be predicated

chooses to orient

to man's

the possession

follow the "categorical

Nevartheless,
of all

men.

evil.

This evil,

free choice end is,

of this

"r~dical

imperative"

This can only be accomplished

evil"

in

evil

this
Through Willkur

his Gesinnung towards the adoption

the moral law to natural

becomes morally

is attributable

the priority

es b~lng of~eeted

explanation

Evil is freely

maxims which subordinate
man's will

of ths

self-renewal.

then,

hunian nature."

Despite

~h!ch recognizes

cnce egain he admits his failure

mAchen!ce of this

evil

to1J1t'!rC-g
the 9ubordinetion

incentives•

of
Thereby,

though "in human nature,"
therefore,

morel evil.

man is comm~nded to

by reorienting

through e personal

his Gesinnun~.
"rebirth."

III.
As stated

THE ISSUE Of RECONCILIATION

earlier,

what we ere able to do.

Kant held thet we ere obligated
Thus, the reality

that cnen is a free and responsible

problematical
be genuinely

section

free,

of freedom.

was suggested

It was concluded

in the Kantian sense,

his will

"cause noumenon," cap~ble of initiating

events

that

end antecedent

spontaneous).

occurrences

Additionally,

of the moral law requires

of Wille.

exercise

or Wille and rulfills

ing maxims which are consistent
respect

by external
of man must be

priori"

status

freedom be defined

of Willkur but also es the

That is,

freedom end humeni ty when Willkur
incentive

and"~

that man's "fullest"

for men to

in the "phenomenal"

the will

the categorical

not merely as the spontaneous
autonomous dictetes

(i.e.

of this

must be viewed as e

world, while at the same time immune from determination
influences

demands

itself
serves es e
inscrutable
faculty which
This is the faculty of
shows to be not only
moral law is, in feet, a
and thus a law of a

a definition

of the thesis,

concept

of morel experience

agent,

• • • the morel principle
principle
of the deduction of en
no experience
can prove • • • • ·
freedom, which the moral law, •••
possible but actual ••••
The
law of causality
through freedom
supersensuous neture.73
In the first

to do only

men realizes

spontaneously
the categorical

with that

his

chooses

11

the autonomous

imperative

imperative

fullest"

by adopt•

..it of pure

fer the moral law.
In thE second section

significant

73

Kantian notions

Kant, Critique

of the thesis
"radical

of Practice!
-32-

innate

me articulated
evil

another

in human nature."

Reason, PP• 48-49.

-33-

Here Kent eppeared
ane of pervesive

tn portray
mor al

By insisting

impulses.

Thet is,

that

contredictfon

whic h ls

and freedom.

It is

in such a way that
es greet

determination
section

men heve chosen

to

within

in Kent's

One place

Kant is committed

is in his

treatmen t of man's
the ~sensuous

ee a predlsposi

his
Uon

the morel

since

Kant defines

7'4

this

Doneld

75

Kant,

fullest

end this

the issue

The task

final

the implications

of

thet

is,

of' man's

of this

of radical

in fact,

in his belief

toe

irreconcilable,

"Kent's

expression

understand-

in his doctrine

maxim than
evil

the "sensuous
nature

rreemen,
Rel igion,

nature."

et which it

the moral law,
since

Evil,

PP• 21-23.

it

the morel

as the "sole
nature"

75

It hes been suggested
other

must be considered
la11 requires

incentive."

es e given part

P• 7.

might

morel autonomy,

man to adopt

motivates

must be considered

~adical

evil

view of men which denies

nature"

towards

of radical

"sensuous

law) be adopted

(I.e.

personel.i ty,

es is

they ere,

discussion

seem that

into

morel condition

of freedom end his definition
whether

lew

74

evil."

incentives

ethics

carefully

ing of human fresdOIII comes to its

bec .euse

man's

e

into

natural

determined,

of nature.

to consider

Freemen i's correct

of' radical.

between

Kent defines

Kentien

the realm

to discover

in order

for

end inextirpable

by some oFf81ling

man) is morally

a p roblem

innate

to the antinomy

that

he (i.e.

is, . therefore,

or whether

similar

charged

both l<enl 1's definition

that

ell

is e universal,

this

of wmn, Kant has been accused

condi tlon

evil

corruption.

of man as being

condition

the dicta c,es of the morel law to the dernands of the "natural"

subjugate

indeed,

the universal

the t it

Moreover,

of men's

as an orientation

tomerds

-34evil

fa~ which men is not responsible.

to be evil

in that

definition,

en essential

Kent's

correctly,

inspection

nature.

position

it

law e lower priority

nature

by

The ovil

is the result

(or perheos

more

in man is not the result

the incentives

of man's choosing

than the natural

it become~ clear

does not in fact

of morel determinism

maxims ~hich include

Rather,

of the text,

of man's sensuous

morel predeterminism).

of his adopting

ls,

of his personelity

7~

definition

commit him to this

men is determined

towards avi1. · 0

oriented

However, upon a closer
thet

part

Therefore,

of the sensuous
to give , the moral

incentives.

Hence the distinction
between a good man and one
who is evil cannot lie in the difference
bet~een the incentives which thsy adopt into their maxim (not in the content
of the maxim), but rather must depend upon subordination
(the
form of the maxim), i.e. which of the two incentives
he makes
the condition of the other.
Consequently man (even the best
is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the
incentives
when he adopts them into his maxim. He adopts,
indeed, the moral law along with the law of self-love;
yet
when he becomes aware that they cannot remain in a par ~ith
each other but that one must be subordinated
to the other
es its supreme condition,
he makes the incentive of selflove and its inclinations
the condition of obedience to the
moral law; whereas, on the contrary,
the latter,
as the
supreme condition of the satisfaction
of the former, ought
to have been adooted into the universal maxim of the will
as the sole incentiva.77

It would seem, then,
that,

•many moralists

occasion
rejects

evil

of evil
this

76
an ea:diet'

77

78

and theologians

in man's sensible

position

in itself

t~~t Silber

and argues

nor the occasion

is right

have ~ought the condition

nature.
that

man's sensible

of evil,

silber,

"Ethicei

nature,

neither

is good and worthy of fulfillment."

PP• 31-32.
Significance,"

or

Kant, however, explicitly

This opinion was advanced by the euthor
paper on this topic.
Kant, Religion,

in his conclusion

P• cxii.

of this

thesis

in

78

Thtu,, if 111an•es~nsuou is miture dr::ie,s r.ot contradict
contrediction

bet.,een

Kant's

doctrines

autonomy must be round elsamhera.
contradiction

ultimately

of redicel

aware of the danger of contradicting

or morel

leter),

himself

concept

end skillfully

of radical

evil,A

•radical

evil

( we shell

but it is to sey that

and particul~rly

for such a

beceoRe Kent wes very well

eutonomy is thorough! y se tisfectory

eey ebout this
terms,

Kant's

avoided

h!'!ve more to

Kant defines

these

At every crucial

comes close

radic:81 evil

such that e contradiction

ing of this
~radical

threat.

innate

At first

evil

in human neture"

for moral froedom, but after
stood,

the difficulties

consider
Indeed,

evil

Kent defines

in experience."
stating

that

"innate"

is

man's

79

But he gives this

tha evil

but only in some s peclal

And this

definition

Men can contradict

79

precludes

understand-

genuine difficulties

defintion

this

of

For instance,

term is underwe generally

es something which is "given.''
in the sense that

definition

only after

the possibility

clearly

to "men himself"

is not "innate"

man's moral freedom,

this

to every use of freedom

that

es its

in the "given"

sense which Kant, himself,

Kant, _fuLlj..9:i.on,P• 17.

with

seems to present

in man is attributable
man's evil

e cleer

where Kent

of the term

es "innate"

evil

point

the introduction

es the ground antecedent

"author. 1180 Therefore,
sense,

Kant's

are resolved.

something whlch

"is posited

he demonstrates

glance,

two

in such e wey as to systematically

of freedom.

morel autonomy would be genara ted,

it.

or his concept

avoid any contradiction
to defining

eny

ev 11 and moral

However, the seereh

proves fruitless,

This is not to say thet

morel freedom,

"innate"

defines.

evil

because K5nt mekes this

in

innate

evil

of it).

in men the result

of rna n ' s freedom (i.e.

man is the author

Now, it is not clear

hom men is responsible

for this

tr the evil is "antecedent
Kant attempts

character,

to ave .ry une of freedom in expElrience."

to resolve

•• • • contradiction

this

problem by stating

to seek the temporal

so far es it is considered

character

signifies

ground (like

the determining

believed

that

rationel

evil

may be doubtful,
1 innetg

Kant defines
concept

1

this

of freedomJ this

81

generally)

Therefore,

for the evil

could be described

to every use of freedom in experience.•
explanation

since

ground of the free will
representations.•

it is a

of men's morel

as contingent,

man could be held responsible

while at the same time this

that

origin

the ground of the exercise

be sought in purely

evil,

must
Kent

in him,

as "antecedent

While the adequacy of this

nevertheless,

in such a way that

the crucial

point

is that

it does not violate

the

of moral freedom by being beyond men's control.
The same situation

of "human nature."
he beers

arises

Rather

no responsibility,

sary antecedent

ground, again,

freedom

•••

epparently

than something "given"
"human nature"

of every act apparent

jective

"82

to Kant's definition

with respect

must itself

to man for which

for Kent is,

to the senses.

contradictory

always be an expression

assertions
this

that

nature

thut man's moral character

does not have a temporal

82
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Kant, Re1igion,

P• 17.

of

lies

two

responsible

is "the necessary

to the senses,"

sub-

of these

man is morally

dent of every act apparent

.!.!?1£!.
•, p •

But this

As abov~, the Kantian reconciliation

for his "human ;iatu!'e" end that

81

"the neces•

in Kant's
origin.

antece-

insistence
Therefore,

-37responsibility
the feet

act.

for "hum~n natur~"

thet

this

Again,

called

into

'innate•

netura

ie nocesserily

the philcsophic~l
question,

c~n b~ ~ttributed
antecedent

effic~cy

but the salient

end 'hum~n nature•

such that

to m~n, despite

of Kant's

to evsry tempot'8l
defense mi~bt be

point

remains

that

their

definitioredo

Kent defines
not deny

the real! ty of morel eutcnorny.
We conclude
is not in feet

But this

therefore

that

contradictory

is net ell

the same time that

that

with his notion

Kant qualifies

to his notion

ing of radical
but also

evil

fairly

of radical

his definition

of radical

moral freedom he atte~pts

of radical

evil.

for et
in

evil

to do full

Thus Kant scught an understand-

which not only fail'S · to violate

represents

evil

of morel freedom.

nesda to be said about the problem,

order to avoid contradicting

justice

Kent• s definition

moral freedom

what Kant took to be man's unlvarsBl,

ful condition.

Therefore,

is to be given,

it ought to be centered

of radicel

and moral freedom but ercund thg adequ~cy of the former

evil

es e meaningful

and cogent description

However, before
of radical
another

~.tVil,

of Kant's

human freedom.
moral expsriencrf
law.

\.Je

the soul,

83

we consider

must point

two concepts

not around the incompatibility

of man's sta ta.

the adequacy of Kant's

po~tulates

In the £:ritigue
and derives

of Kant's

out e possible

metaphysical

From the certainty

metaphysical

if any criticism

sin-

contr ad.i.r:tfon with

besides

of Practical

doctrine

the postulate

of

ReE.l.son,Kant begins with

from it the "£. prio£.1.it truth

of the moral

of the moral law, Kont der!.ves three

postulatos:
(3) the existence

(1) human freedom,
of God.

Kent, r;_ritJJJYs of Practical

83

(2) the immortality

of

The argument for tha immortality

Reason, P• 126 and following.

of' the soul

is rother

simple,

the highest

good is~

necess9ry

. the attainment
the "complete
attainment

Kent sugg E?sts

condition

of the highe s t
fitness

good is a necessary

condition

(i.e.

implies

good) is else

"holiness"

the attainment
to thet

complete

requires

(1) "an infinitely

of the same rational

requires

In turn,

enduring

existence"

Taken together,

the irr.mortali ty of the soul.

s.o.tU! i~ proved

necessary

by showing

conditions

in this

thet

it

ultimetely

In short,
stands

traced

the

of intentions

the attainment

lire.

this

condition,

of the moral

•complete

the existance

fitness."

being."

(i.e.

But, this

which is unattainable

progress

define

condition

fitness

or

However,

Since,

condition

"the complete

necessary.

of "holiness"

necessery

to the mol'!!l le••"

to the moral law") of this necessary
of the highest

or the morel law.

impli e s as its

of intentions

of the highest

law, the necessary

901:id

the ettainment

that

fitness"

Therefore,

of an "endless
"endless

progress"

and (2) the "personality
these

two cheracteristics

the i~mortali ty of the

at the enci of a series

of

back to the "!t prior..!," existence

of the moral law.
Houever,
Gesinnung,

in the BeJigion

Kant suggests

tion and his actions

that

and specifically
there

in his discussion

is a gap between man's moral disposi-

~hich ar~ carried

out through his "sen suous nature."

That iss it' a r.i,m revers e s, by a si r.r?l e unchangeable decision,
t hat highest ground of his maxh is wher eby
he was an evil man, •••
he is, so far as his principle
end cast of mind ere conc s rned, a subject su sce ptible of
goodness, •••
But in th e judg ment of men, who ca n appraise
themselves and the stre"gth
of their maxims only by th e
ascendancy which th ey win over their sen suous na ture in
time, this change must be r egarded as ng!hing but an everduring struggle
to ward the better •••

84

Kant, Religi£ D, P• 43.

of

..39 ..
Tha reversal

of manJs .fillnnun_g_ from the propensity

en orientation
in fact.
this

towards

the essence

reversal

himself

the good is the key to mor-al goodness.

of moral goodness,

or rsvolution

in , overt

itself

ecti.ons

is effected

calls

into question

between Gesinnung and action

Presumably

for Kent, ections

can result

if this

from evil

dependent

is entirely

Thus, man sees

es it relates

ere irrelevant
maxims.

in order

of'the

it

is not attainable

of the soul is necessary
proof and its

of God,

of the

to moral status.

to moral! ty because

Therefore

to attain

soul rests

notion

of his Gesinnung.

application

There '.'ere two alternative

"holiness."

is to make "holiness"

for man

Kent's

upon the assumption

proof

that

since
But,

the immortality

the morel law.

The key to this

to Gesinnung is the definition
ways of understanding

However,

it necessary

in the "world of sense,"
to fulfill

"good"

a man's moral status

is commanded by the moral lew, it must be attainable.

holiness
since

the entire

upon the inclination

immortality

for the immortality

to menifest

_when in the sight

is the case one wonders why Kent thinks

to possess

It is

goodness. 85

connection

actions

to

However, even 111hen

it somsho~ fails

"toward the better,"

attained

However, this

for Kant.

due to man's sensuous neture.

es progressing

he hes already

towa!'ds evil

this

of "holiness."

term.

The first

synonymous with the concept of a "holy will"

which Kant defines

as a "will incapable of any maxims which conflict
86
"11th the morel law.' 1
However, if Kant intended to use "holiness•
this

way when applied

that

the immortality

to man's moral development,
of the soul is totally

then it would seem

irrelevant

85 Ibid.
86Kant, Critique

of Preictical

in

Reeson, P• 32.

to the attainment

-40-

of' such e stete.
evolutionary

process

thus,

effect,

The ~ttainmerrt

"holiness"

which requires

the nece~sity

ls understood

e mir~culous

with

this

is the case

namely holiness

man's dlspoeltlon"(l.o.

Gesinnuno).

his basic

good end edopting

possibility

there is e conflict
Ceslnnun~and

~n immortal

88

K~nt, R~lioion,

fitness

11

P• 43.

that

of the will

or "re•;olution

Tfiat is,

holiness

from evil

in • • •
consists

towards

in

the

for the morel lew (i.e.

life."

this

And it

in man's mortal

goodness (i.e.

reverse

"revolution"

!s precisely

existence

that

in the

of holiness

.then the:t:'e ls no reason

men can evidently

P• 1'26.

is,

from a "holy will"

Thus, if the attainment

of moral goodness,

soul because

87 Ibid.,

88

between m~n•s interior

his actions.

the achievement

~1 rebirth

in "this

ls realizable

why the

alternative

However, Kant represents

and even e fact
revolution

is no reason

whet is

ls synonymous with tvhat Kant

moral orientation

good).

but rether

of man's personality.

different

maxims out of pure respect

men's becoming morally

this

of edcpting

is exectly

The other

as the complete

in the E,el,igion es man's

man's reversing

But, if

sense would require

this

then there

as something

ttholingss"

87
to the moral le1111

because

that

to

then whet ls necessary

in this

to suggesting

"holiness"

when he describes

es e

the moral lew,

of the soul is essentiel.

Kent understands

describes

of the soul.

becoming "incapable"

~~

es

amount of time

ect which would change the essence

but if

immortality

an inf!nite

To make man "holy"

At . times Kent comes close
necessary,

is represented

~mount of time for men's morel evolution

event.

e supernatural

"holiness"

of the immortality

~s man's

eny maxims which conflict
is not en infinite

of

means

to posit

his Cesinnung before

-41del!lth end thus become holy.
the correletion
see himself
etteined

es progressing

towards

do not effect

men's ections

did effect

actions

of the sensuous

three

soul.

nature.

ects

metaphysical

between it and radical

heving

to morality
If

in ~hich ~en is free

But, since

evil

to our discussion

the external

or even relevant
then the rationale

of the soul ~is undermined.

By separating

Kent seems to contradict
hypotheses,

one of his

tha immortality

of the soul is not crucial

system es a whole, end therefore

red!cel

life

ere not influential

However, the immortality

ethical

return

in en after

nature

from man's sensuous
fundamental,

erg incidental

of m~ral goodness or holiness,

the immortality

~orelity

than elreedy

men's Gesinnung then one could see why

of the sensuous

in the determination
behind

actions

is

which, causes men to

men's morel goodness or holiness.

could only be etteined

the limitations

is not perfected

the good rether

But, es we heve seen,

end therefore

fro•

that

bgtween Gesinnung end actions,

it.

holiness

The only thing

is serious

the alleged

for Kent•s

contradiction

but not fatal.

of the adequacy of Kant's

of the

IAlemust now

understanding

of

evil.

[he first
Kent establishes
e corrupt

thing

that

the feet

propensity

ought to be noted is the means by which
of "radicel

must indeed

proved in view of the multitude
puts before

our eyes•"

of radical

evil

experience

or history

89

89.1..E.llf_•, p.

28.

be rooted
of crying

In other

is established
generally

evil."

words,

"That such

in man need not be formally
examples which experience
the certainty

by experience.
demonstrate

Kent writes,

of the existence

However, sppeals
nothing

•••

to

more than personal

-42preference

end are conclusive

accepting

the very conclusion

inclined

to believe

nature,"

then one will

experience.
e belief,

If,

that

end limitations
propensity

most likely

connection

of such a proof,

to evil

" •••

in human nature
opposition,

do not teach us the essential

or the ground of ·this
to experience

can be regarded

most informal

of philosophical

human nature."

Neverthaless

the fact

that

that all

much more stringent

90 Ibid.,
91

PP•

propensity

But it is not clear
as forceful

of this

to the law, such

that

an

even if taken as the

for "radical

innate

evil

in

is the only proof which Kent offers
to locete

evil

et the very

to experience

a fundamental
of this

propensity
conclusion

proof than the one Kant offers.

to

then his proof

But Kant not only wished to establish

the establishment

evil"

by experiential

or that

If Kant had appealed

men possess

It would seem that

could

with the informality

men commit some morel misdeeds,

would be more pela table.

"evidence"

even if the existence

of a view of man which proposes

core of man's personality.

but also

proofs
this

towards such

can be demonstrated

90

in

between "radical

in time, of man's will

opposition."

if one is

confirmed

experience

character,

towerds

in humen

persuasive

Kent saw this and was content

proofs

verify

belier

Of course,

logical

of the real

on behalf

evil

hand, one is not inclined

proofs

appeal

Thet is,

innate

see this

of such evil.

e strictly

end human nature.

"!'ftdical

is

is broed enough to afford

to deny the existence
never establish

under ccnsideration.

there

on the other

experience

only for those ~ho ere predisposed

this,

towards evil.
requires

a

91

3o-:n.

It is, however, possible that the general religious
climate
of Kent's time would have made the appeal to experience more powerful,
both for Kent and his contamporeries,
than it is for us today.
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The f'inel
Kent's

point whii:h

doctrine

of radical

wa

evil

it.loulG l!ke

is to m8ke every
~en.

Indeed,

strong

evil

the alleged

contradiction
obvious

that

it becomes clear

against

men's ne ture,

that ell

evil

weakness.

in human nature"

between radical

evil

and

description

of

the terms in his definition

is in fact

little

is prac.isoly

St. Paul,

extent.

Kant writes,

redic21l nature
"repudiate

of ma n's

to reject

suggested,

his fundamental
Plato

evil

radical

etc.)

precisely

before

ethical

and philosophers

namely, that

11, the fact

that

support,

evidence

human freedom.

considered

es illusory ■

but ha exposed its

92

ultimate

He

"The Ethical

ttKant, like

the date which seemed contrary
the

gave his theory momentary

weakness."

93

The ultimate

Kent, Relig:i .on, P• '.31.

93 Silber,

he does

of violating

to his theory and, , like pJa to, used his theory to dismiss
contravoning

the

Yet Kant felt

rebel ■ h

ewere of the possibility

pr esupposition:

him, explicitly

to it). 1192

becauso he was, as we have

t his possibility

intensely

the

who hold to a view of

would suggest:

s in lies

"Man (even

repudiate

obedfance

whet m!lny thoologians

the moral l~w in the manner of a

it necessary
already

(renouncing

Kierkega ~rd, Nietzsche,

men epproximating

charge

more then the mere recognition

limited

morel lem in the mi:nner- of a rebel

(e.g.

of radical

what ~eemed to be a very serious

the most wicked) doss not, under any maxim whatsoever,

this

of

However, as we examine more closely

men a~e immorel to~

And yet,

to

comment upon the nature

if we take Kant's

at "face value."

the way in which Ksnt defines
evil,

innate

and far reaching

morel freedom is almost
radical

to it~ ultimate

raletes

To say thet man is plagued by "redical

to make 1111th respect

Significance,"

P• cxxix.

••U-

weakness

is,

in K!l.nt' s underste!"ding

in fact,

neither

common understanding
seems to represent

the religious

of these

terms.

tradition

of his time.

K3ntien radical

part

to remain fa.lthful

But, Kant's

es it wee ethical.

11oral autonomy,

he qualified

contradiction.

The result

of radical

his definition

be described

to

would indeed contradict
in order to remove the
view cf morel au t0nomy

but one which does not do justice

which could appropriately

to

basic concern was

And es it was clear
evil

is e consistent

in the

evil

Rather,

on Kant's

definition

evil,

the t for him evil

is,

.innate or e port of humen nature

never as much religious

end radical

avil

redicel,

en attempt

him thet e strong

of radical

as "radical,

toe

view of man

innate

evil

in

human nature."
~oral

freedom, understood

autonomy, and radical

evil,

no way contradictory.
outside

of their

understood

Nevertheless,

of Ksntien

likely

to be of great

notion

of radical

evil

as seriously

of moral nutonomy.

it,

of their

end
are in

compatibility

remains en unans•uered question.

religion

satisfaction

as Kent defines
the issue

Kantian definitions

And the consistency

concept

es the union of spontaneity

with Kantian ethics

is not

to those who wish to take the
end as literally

as they do tho
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